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Recent Development 
People v. Burns: The Unconstitutionality of the 
Illinois Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon 
Statute 
Maria Elena Martinez* 
On December 17, 2015, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. 
Burns.1  In a decision written by Justice Burke, the court found section 
24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon 
(“AUUW”) statute, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6, unconstitutional on its face 
because it is a flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home, 
without being limited to a subset of persons, such as felons.2  The court 
further held that the provision is not enforceable against anyone, and it 
thus vacated defendant Edward Burns’s conviction and sentence for 
AUUW.3  Justice Garman, joined by Justice Thomas, specially 
concurred, arguing that the statute as applied to the defendant does not 
violate the Second Amendment, and thus it cannot be facially 
unconstitutional on that basis.4  Instead, the concurrence contended, the 
statute is facially unconstitutional because it violates due process, as it 
does not require the State to plead and prove an essential element of the 
 
* Loyola University Chicago School of Law, J.D. expected May 2016; B.S., Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 2013.  She would like to thank the Editorial Board for Volume 47 of the 
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for this opportunity and its hard work editing this Recent 
Development. 
1. People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387. 
2. Id. ¶ 25.  The AUUW statute provides that a person commits an AUUW offense when he or 
she knowingly: 
Carries on or about his or her person or in any vehicle or concealed on or about his or 
her person except when on his or her land or in his or her abode, legal dwelling, or 
fixed place of business, or on the land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an 
invitee with that person’s permission, any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other 
firearm; . . . [and] the firearm, other than a pistol, revolver, or handgun, possessed was 
uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible at the time of the offense . . . . 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (2016). 
3. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 32. 
4. Id. ¶ 35. 
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offense—the defendant’s lack of Second Amendment rights.5 
In deciding the case, the majority in Burns extended its previous 2013 
decision in People v. Aguilar,6 noting that some of the language used in 
the modified opinion had inappropriately referred to the Class 2 and 
Class 4 forms of the AUUW offense.7  In Aguilar, the court held that 
section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute operates as a ban 
on an individual’s right to possess a gun for self-defense outside the 
home, and was thus facially unconstitutional under the Second 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.8  Yet, it limited the holding to the 
“Class 4 form” of the offense.9  The Burns majority noted that such 
offenses do not exist, and the elements of AUUW are those explicitly 
contained in subsection (a) of the statute.10  Therefore, section 24-
1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute is facially unconstitutional 
without limitation.11 
The AUUW statute sets forth the two-prong structure of the AUUW 
offense in subsection (a), first providing that a person commits such 
offense when he or she: 
[K]nowingly (1) [c]arries on or about his or her person or in any 
vehicle or concealed on or about his or her person except when on his 
or her land or in his or her abode, legal dwelling, or fixed place of 
business . . . any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm; or 
(2) [c]arries or possesses on or about his or her person, upon any 
public street, alley, or other public lands[,] . . . for the purpose of the 
display of such weapon or the unlawful commerce in weapons, . . . 
any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm . . . .12 
Second, one of eleven aggravating factors must be present.13  The 
aggravating factor at issue in Burns was factor (a)(3)(A), which states, 
“the firearm, other than a pistol, revolver, or handgun, possessed was 
 
5. Id. ¶ 51. 
6. 2 N.E.3d 321 (Ill. 2013). 
7. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 22 (“However, we now acknowledge that our reference in 
Aguilar to a ‘Class 4 form’ of the offense was inappropriate.”). 
8. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d at 327–28. 
9. Id. at 327 n.3 (“[W]e reiterate and emphasize that our finding of unconstitutionality in this 
decision is specifically limited to the Class 4 form of AUUW, as set forth in section 24-1.6(a)(1), 
(a)(3)(A), [and] (d) of the AUUW statute.  We make no finding, express or implied, with respect 
to the constitutionality of unconstitutionality of any other section or subsection of the AUUW 
statute.”).  The “Class 4 form” of AUUW referred to a conviction that was subject to sentencing 
as a Class 4 felony pursuant to section (d) of the statute. 
10. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶¶ 22–23. 
11. Id. ¶ 25. 
12. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.6(a)(1)–(2) (2016) (emphasis added). 
13. Id. at 5/24-1.6(a)(3)(A)–(I). 
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uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible at the time of the 
offense.”14  Subsection (d)(1) of the statute, titled “Sentence,” provides 
that the offense of AUUW is a Class 4 felony, and a second or 
subsequent offense is a Class 2 felony.15  It then lists certain factors that 
increase the classification of an individual’s felony class.16  For 
example, the classification increases from a Class 4 felony to a Class 2 
felony if the person found guilty of committing the offense is a 
convicted felon.17 
Appellant Edward Burns was arrested on June 13, 2009, for 
AUUW.18  Earlier that day, two police officers in a marked squad car 
responded to a call of shots fired.19  As they approached the 
intersection, one of the officers observed a four-door Nissan with three 
individuals entering it.20  When the squad car pulled up in front of the 
Nissan, the officer saw the front passenger, later identified as Burns, 
exiting with a gun in his hand.21  When the police officer ordered him to 
put his hands up, Burns tossed the gun back into the car and fled on 
foot.22  While the officer pursued him, Burns threw a firearm magazine 
containing bullets on the ground.23  The second officer recovered from 
the car the firearm that Burns had thrown, which contained a live 
round.24  The magazine recovered during the chase fit the recovered 
firearm.25  Burns was eventually apprehended when he came back to the 
Nissan.26 
Burns was charged by an indictment that contained eleven counts: 
count I alleged that Burns was an armed habitual criminal; counts II and 
III alleged unlawful use of a weapon by a felon; and counts IV through 
XI alleged AUUW.27  After the court entered an order of nolle prosequi 
on four counts alleging AUUW based on Burns’s possession of a 
 
14. Id. at 5/24-1.6(a)(3)(A). 
15. Id. at 5/24-1.6(d)(1).  For a Class 2 felony, the person “shall be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years.”  Id. 
16. Id. at 5/24-1.6(d)(2)–(4). 
17. Id. at 5/24-1.6(d)(3). 
18. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 1, People v. Burns, 4 N.E.3d 151 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (No. 
1-12-0929). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 3, Burns, 4 N.E.3d 151 (No. 1-12-0929). 
22. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 1. 
23. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 21, at 3. 
24. Id. 
25. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 18, at 2. 
26. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 21, at 3. 
27. People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 8. 
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firearm without a valid Firearm Owner Identification (“FOID”) card, 
the State proceeded on counts I, II, III, VI, and X.28  The trial court 
found Burns guilty on all counts at a bench trial, classified him as a 
Class X offender, and sentenced him to serve ten years’ 
imprisonment.29 
Burns filed a motion to reconsider in the circuit court, arguing that 
the State failed to prove that he had a prior felony conviction, a 
necessary element of the charged offenses, and that as a result his 
convictions must be vacated.30  The circuit court agreed that a prior 
felony conviction was a necessary element of both the armed habitual 
criminal and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon offenses and 
accordingly vacated those convictions; however, it denied Burns’s 
motion with regard to the AUUW convictions, finding that a prior 
felony conviction is not an element of AUUW, but rather a sentencing 
factor.31  At sentencing, the State presented evidence of Burns’s prior 
felony conviction and the circuit court ruled that Burns’s conviction for 
AUUW was a Class 2 felony pursuant to subsection (d) of the AUUW 
statute.32 
Burns appealed, arguing that his AUUW conviction must be vacated 
because section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute, under 
which he was convicted, infringed on his Second Amendment rights.33  
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District affirmed Burns’s 
AUUW convictions.34  The court relied on the modified opinion of the 
Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Aguilar, which held that section 24-
1.16(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute is facially unconstitutional 
for the Class 4 form of the AUUW offense.35  The court reasoned that 
 
28. Id. ¶ 10.  Counts VI and X alleged violations of section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) and section 
24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute based on the possession of an uncased, loaded, and 
readily accessible firearm in a vehicle and on a public way, respectively.  Id. 
29. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 21, at 4; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 
18, at 4. 
30. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 11.  The State introduced a certified copy of conviction for a 
“Damion Smith” at trial, alleging that it was an alias, but it did not present evidence to show 
Burns was that individual.  Id. 
31. Id. ¶ 12. 
32. Id. ¶ 13; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.6(d)(3) (2016) (providing a felony 
classification increase to Class 2 if the person found guilty is also a convicted felon).  The circuit 
court ultimately sentenced Burns as a Class X felon and imposed a ten-year sentence because the 
State presented evidence in aggravation of two other prior felony convictions.  Burns, 2015 IL 
117387, ¶ 13. 
33. Id. ¶ 14; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 21, at 5. 
34. People v. Burns, 4 N.E.3d 151, 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
35. Id. at 152, 157 (“The modified opinion in Aguilar, however, specifies the decision ‘is 
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because the ruling in Aguilar referenced the Class 4 form of the offense, 
the Class 2 form of the offense, which enhances the penalty for felons, 
could remain enforceable.36  Noting that the U.S. Supreme Court and 
the Illinois Supreme Court have recognized the prohibition of firearm 
possession by felons, it concluded that felons lack Second Amendment 
rights.37  Consequently, it held that a conviction under section 24-
1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute, which pursuant to subsection 
(d) is a Class 2 felony because the defendant has a prior felony 
conviction, is not unconstitutional.38  The court concluded that the so-
called “Class 2 form” of the offense was enforceable and affirmed 
Burns’s conviction.39  Burns appealed again. 
The sole issue argued to the Illinois Supreme Court was whether 
section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute is facially 
unconstitutional because it violates the rights to keep and bear arms, as 
guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
Appellant Burns argued that the appellate court erred in holding that 
the “Class 2 form” of the AUUW statute was constitutional, and that in 
fact, a “Class 2 form” of AUUW does not exist.40  Burns relied on the 
language of section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) to contend that there is only 
one offense of AUUW, and that a prior felony conviction is not an 
element of that offense.41  Instead, a prior felony conviction is merely 
used at sentencing to elevate the offense from a Class 4 felony to a 
Class 2 felony.42  Furthermore, Burns pointed to Aguilar, where the 
court held that the same provision of the AUUW statute under which he 
was convicted was facially unconstitutional.43  Thus, as Burns argued, 
his conviction must be reversed.44 
The State’s argument relied on the principle that a statute is facially 
unconstitutional only if no set of circumstances exists under which the 
 
specifically limited to the Class 4 form of AUUW.’” (quoting People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 
328 n.3 (Ill. 2013))). 
36. Id. at 157. 
37. Id. at 158 (“Thus, we conclude the possession of firearms by felons is conduct that falls 
outside the scope of the second amendment’s protection.”). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 20. 
41. Id. 
42. Id.; see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.6(d)(3) (2016) (“Aggravated unlawful use of a 
weapon by a person who has been previously convicted of felony in this State or another 
jurisdiction is a Class 2 felony for which the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
of not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years.”). 
43. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 20; People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 323 (Ill. 2013). 
44. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 20. 
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statute would be valid.45  The State maintained that because section 24-
1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute can be applied to felons 
without violating the Second Amendment, it was not facially 
unconstitutional.46 
The court relied on its Aguilar decision to hold that section 24-
1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute was unconstitutional as 
written.47  In Aguilar, the court held that the section operated as an 
absolute ban on an individual’s right to possess a gun for self-defense 
outside the home, making it facially unconstitutional under the Second 
Amendment.48  The Burns court noted, however, that its Aguilar 
decision inappropriately referenced a “Class 4 form” of the AUUW 
offense, to which it limited the holding.49  It found that neither a “Class 
4 form” nor “Class 2 form” AUUW offense exists.50  In so doing, it 
looked to the elements of the offense contained in subsection (a) of the 
statute, which provides that a person commits the offense of AUUW 
when, first, he or she knowingly carries or possesses “any pistol, 
revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm” that is “on or about his or 
her person or in any vehicle” or “on or about his or her person, upon 
any public street,” and second, one of the eleven aggravating factors is 
present.51  The court reasoned that to obtain a conviction, the State need 
only prove those elements.52 
 
45. Id. ¶ 26.  This principle was enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to 
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances 
exists under which the Act would be valid.  The fact that the [statute] might operate 
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render 
it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an “overbreadth” doctrine outside the 
limited context of the First Amendment. 
481 U.S. at 745. 
46. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 26. 
47. Id. ¶¶ 21–25. 
48. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d at 327–28.  The Aguilar decision expressly adopted the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis and holding in Moore v. Madigan that sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of 
Illinois’s AUUW statute operated as a “flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home,” 
and thus was unconstitutional on its face.  Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d at 326 (quoting Moore v. Madigan, 
702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012)).  The Illinois Supreme Court has reaffirmed the holding of 
Aguilar in two unanimous opinions.  See People v. Mosley, 33 N.E.3d 137, 150 (Ill. 2015) 
(“[B]ecause defendant’s conviction under count II involves the same subsection of the AUUW 
statute found unconstitutional in Aguilar, that portion of the trial court’s judgment vacating count 
II is affirmed.”); In re Jordan G., 33 N.E.3d 162, 165 (Ill. 2015) (noting the Aguilar holding). 
49. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 22. 
50. Id. ¶ 22. 
51. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/24-1.6(a) (2016); Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 23. 
52. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 23. 
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The court then looked to subsection (d), entitled “Sentence,” and 
noted that it provides that the offense of AUUW is a Class 4 felony, and 
lists factors that increase the sentence from one classification to a higher 
level classification.53  The court declared that the sentencing factor by 
which the legislature increases the penalty for any violation of the 
statute from a Class 4 felony to a Class 2 felony—the person found 
guilty of AUUW is convicted felon—does not create separate and 
distinct offenses of AUUW or transform the AUUW offense into a 
different “form.”54  Furthermore, it held that these factors only come 
into play after the defendant is found guilty.55  Thus, the Court 
concluded that it had improperly limited the holding in Aguilar as 
applying only to the “Class 4 form” of the offense, and clarified that 
section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute is facially 
unconstitutional without limitation.56 
Next, the court rejected the State’s argument that, because the statute 
could be applied to felons without violating the Second Amendment, it 
was not facially unconstitutional.57  The court noted that the statutory 
provision prohibited the possession and use of a firearm for self-defense 
outside the home, amounting to a wholesale ban on the exercise of a 
right guaranteed by the Constitution.58  The court reasoned it was 
precisely because the prohibition is not limited to a subset of person, 
such as felons, that the statute is unconstitutional on its face.59 
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court decision of District of Columbia 
v. Heller,60 the court found that the legislature indeed could 
constitutionally prohibit felons from carrying readily accessible guns 
outside the home.61  The court noted, however, the legislature did not 
 
53. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.6(d); Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 24. 
54. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 24.  Subsection (d)(3) of the statute, under “Sentence,” 
provides: “Aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a person who has been previously convicted 
of a felony in this State or another jurisdiction is a Class 2 felony . . . .”  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/24-1.6(d)(3). 
55. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 24. 
56. Id. ¶ 25. 
57. Id. ¶ 26. 
58. Id. ¶ 25 (citing In re Jordan G., 33 N.E.3d 162, 165 (Ill. 2015); People v. Aguilar, 2 
N.E.3d 321, 327–28 (Ill. 2013)). 
59. Id. 
60. 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (“Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical 
analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be 
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill.”). 
61. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶¶ 28–29.  In fact, Illinois has legislation prohibiting felons from 
possessing guns at all.  See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.1(a) (2016) (setting forth the elements 
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regulate this activity in section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW 
statute, as it did not include a prior felony conviction as an element of 
the offense.62  For this reason, the court concluded that the fact that the 
statute is applied to convicted felons—a category of persons who the 
legislature could have regulated had it seen fit to do so—does not make 
it become constitutional.63 
Finally, the court considered improperly conditioning the 
constitutionality of the provision on the State’s proof of a defendant’s 
felony conviction when the legislature itself did not make that 
requirement an element of the offense.64  It noted that to do so would be 
to do the job reserved for the legislature.65  Ultimately, the court 
decided that the legislature would have to act to prevent the provision 
from being facially unconstitutional.66 
Thus, relying on a modification of Aguilar, and also considering the 
plain language of section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute, 
the court held that such provision was facially unconstitutional, and 
therefore, Burns’s conviction and sentence for AUUW were vacated. 
In a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Garman also 
found section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute facially 
unconstitutional, but on the basis that it violated due process, as it did 
not require the State to plead and prove an essential element of the 
offense.67  The concurrence contended that because the Aguilar opinion 
was modified, the court had not previously held that the statutory 
section at issue was facially unconstitutional.68  Nevertheless, Justice 
Garman argued, the court never considered whether the statutory 
section could constitutionally be enforced against those subject to 
sentences other than Class 4 sentences—those who have been 
previously convicted of a felony and who have diminished Second 
Amendment rights.69  While the concurrence recognized that the 
 
of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon). 
62. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 29. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. ¶ 30. 
65. Id. (“In essence, we would be ‘rewrit[ing] state law to conform it to constitutional 
requirements’ and ‘substitut[ing] the judicial for the legislative department of the government.’” 
(alterations in original) (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 
329–30 (2006))). 
66. See id. 
67. Id. ¶ 35 (Garman, J., concurring).  In fact, the concurrence held that the statute as applied 
to Burns did not violate the Second Amendment.  Id. 
68. Id. ¶ 36. 
69. Id. 
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provision restricted conduct protected by the Second Amendment, it 
disagreed with the majority that a ban on certain conduct within the 
scope of the amendment is inherently facially unconstitutional.70  Citing 
decisions by a variety of courts, the concurrence noted that certain 
classes of individuals can be restricted from possessing and using 
weapons.71  Therefore, it concluded “that the AUUW statute as applied 
to someone without full [S]econd [A]mendment rights is not 
unconstitutional based on a violation of the [S]econd [A]mendment.”72 
The concurrence criticized the majority’s holding as straying from 
the “no set of circumstances” rule.73  It noted that the majority’s 
assertion that the court should not consider the application of the 
statutory provision to felons when determining whether the section is 
facially constitutional was incorrect because the section applied to all 
individuals.74  Because the U.S. Constitution permits the government to 
restrict the right to keep and bear arms for individuals with prior 
felonies and the Illinois legislature chose to do so through the AUUW 
statute, the concurring opinion concluded that the law at issue was 
restrictive, and thus, the majority should have considered its application 
to felons when determining whether the law was facially 
unconstitutional.75  As a result, the concurrence found that as applied to 
Burns, the law did not violate any right protected by the Second 
Amendment and that it could not be facially unconstitutional on that 
ground.76  It contended that the majority’s holding expands the doctrine 
of overbreadth by imposing a requirement that the statute specifically 
state that it applies to felons, or to those with diminished Second 
Amendment rights, to comply with the Second Amendment.77 
 
70. Id. ¶ 37. 
71. Id. ¶¶ 41–43 (mentioning classes such as felons, the mentally ill, minors, and illegal 
aliens). 
72. Id. ¶ 43. 
73. Id. ¶ 44. 
74. Id. ¶ 46 (“The AUUW section at issue here applies to all individuals; therefore, felons are 
part of ‘the group for whom the law is a restriction.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992))). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. ¶ 47.  The doctrine of overbreadth allows a challenger to prove that a law is facially 
unconstitutional even if it is valid in some circumstances if he can show that “a substantial 
number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010)).  
Additionally, the concurrence noted that overbroad statutes are considered facially 
unconstitutional in the context of the First Amendment because of the chilling effects such laws 
have on free speech, but that there is no similar concern that the AUUW statute will have an 
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Finally, the concurrence argued that the section cannot be enforced 
even against those with diminished Second Amendment rights without 
violating due process.78  It noted that the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution requires the State to prove every element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, including any fact, other than a prior 
conviction, that subjects the defendant to a harsher penalty.79  
Consequently, because a defendant cannot constitutionally be convicted 
of AUUW under section (a)(1), (a)(3)(A) unless he or she lacks Second 
Amendment rights, the lack of such a right is a fact that the State must 
prove.80  The statute, however, does not include that requirement.  
Therefore, the concurrence concluded that the statute is facially 
unconstitutional based on a violation of due process. 
The People v. Burns decision will likely appeal to criminal 
defendants.  An Illinois appellate court has already remanded a case to 
the trial court for re-sentencing in light of Burns.81  Similarly, in People 
v. McGee, the appellate court acknowledged that under Burns, any 
conviction under section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) is unconstitutional and 
therefore void ab initio, regardless of the person’s criminal 
background.82  The case raises questions about whether prosecutors will 
be able to sustain unlawful possession convictions.83  It also reveals the 
continuing challenge gun possession cases present to Illinois judges, 
and the difficulty in interpreting Illinois gun laws.84  The Illinois 
Supreme Court’s decision in Burns, and the appeals that will likely 
arise, might suggest that the Illinois legislature needs to repeal the 
current gun laws and draft ones that are easier to interpret and enforce.  
Until then, the implications from Burns might prove favorable for felons 
 
inappropriate chilling effect on those with full Second Amendment rights who wish to carry 
firearms.  Id. ¶ 49. 
78. Id. ¶ 51. 
79. Id. ¶ 51 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). 
80. Id. ¶ 51. 
81. See generally People v. Smith, 2016 IL App (2d) 130997 (finding that the defendant’s 
AUUW conviction was invalid and could not be considered in aggravation of a separate 
sentence). 
82. People v. McGee, 2016 IL App (1st) 141013, ¶¶ 15, 19. 
83. See, e.g., Jim Dey, State High Court Ruling in Gun Case May Affect Local Case, NEWS-
GAZETTE (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.news-gazette.com/opinion/columns/2016-01-05/jim-dey-
state-high-court-ruling-gun-case-may-affect-local-case.html (“[T]he ruling raises questions about 
whether Champaign County prosecutors will be able to sustain on appeal an unlawful possession 
conviction against Matt Sinclair, a former University of Illinois football player and staff 
member.”). 
84. See generally id. 
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convicted of AUUW offenses. 
